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The prohibition of abuse of right calls into question that branch of legal positivism
that sees law as a ‘pure’ discipline with necessarily no connection with morality (the
so-called exclusive positivism). Law prohibits something that is allowed within its
own system, but that is rejected according to other rules (the rules of morality). Is the
law therefore flawed? Is it cynical? One might object and say that if the prohibition
exists in a legal system it is not extra-legal anymore. But this is a purely formalistic
reading, which fails to reflect the reality that there are moral considerations that filter
into a legal system. It is due to positivistic anxiety to avoid the negative influence of
morality.
In this post we will take a look at the late Republican Roman legal system, trying
to conceptualise their basis for prohibiting ‘abuse of right’ and reflect on whether
that system can act as a source of inspiration for international law today through a
‘Roman law analogy’.
Abuse of right is a glitch in the system. A logomachy. Even a logical paradox,
according to the reconstruction of Guski. As an eminent commentator has it: ‘[i]f I
use my right, my act is licit; and when it is illicit it is because I exceed my right and
act without right. The quote stems from Planiol’s (1853-1931), Treatise on the Civil
law of 1928 and illustrates that the overuse of rights may result in an unlawful act.
In a first sense, abuse of right occurs when power conferred by law is exercised
for the sole purpose of creating damage to another. In another sense, abuse of
right is when a power conferred by law is exercised intentionally for an end which is
different from the purpose for which the right has been created for, with the result
that damage to someone else is caused.
In both cases, the notion of ‘abuse of right’ implies that extra-legal considerations
(among which, moral ones: ‘the action is lawful, but is it right?’) enter into the system
of law. But this exclusively holds true in a modern understanding of the law. The
distinction between ‘law’ and ‘morality’ would have been puzzling to a Roman lawyer:
the ones that, for us, are moral considerations, were fully fledged legal tools, in the
sense that they were fully integrated in the legal system. A famous definition of ‘law’
given by the Roman lawyer Celsus (2nd century a.C.) is ‘the art of what is good and
fair’. The notion of Aequitas (equity) is a perfect example (Digestus 1,1,1).
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Roman Law
Aequitas was the legal tool used to counter abuses of right through the mechanisms
we explain below. As mentioned, in the Roman legal system equity was not just
about morality in the way we understand it: it became a technical legal tool.
How did aequitas ‘filter’ into the legal system? It was through the notion of good
faith. The Digest’s passage attributed to Tryphoninus makes this link explicit: ‘The
good faith that is required in contracts calls for maximum equity’. Good faith and
equity were applied not only to regulate specific types of contract, to resolve single
concrete disputes or avoid technical controversies, but also to produce other juridical
instruments (such as actiones, actions at law).
One of such actions based on good faith was introduced in the civil law precisely to
tackle abuse of right: the actio doli (‘action against fraud’). Famously, the Digest says
‘no one, who exercises his own right, is deemed to harm others’:  this encounter
limits precisely with the actio doli. There is indeed an abuse at least every time one
uses his own right fraudulently.
Successively, the action would be made available also to the defendants in a legal
dispute (the exceptio doli). The inextricable link between the exceptio doli, equity
(and thus good faith) is clearly expressed by Paulus (Digestus 44.4.1.1.): «The
praetor established this defence to the end that a person’s fraud should not benefit
him through the medium of the civil law but contrary to natural equity (…)».   Paulus
asserted that this specific instrument could be adopted as a relief for the gaps of
defences available in law, or against anyone who wanted to use maliciously the
rights that the law itself provided to him.
Aequitas and good faith were thus, among other things, the mechanisms through
which late republican and imperial Roman law let the system adjust to moral and
political demands – those were the instruments allowing for ‘flexibility and change’:
a task that the law has to carry out at every time. In fact, the concept that (modern)
international law allows for flexibility and change is borrowed from Lauterpacht –
which allows us to transition to the next section.
Contemporary International Law
Today, it is fair to state that the notion of ‘abuse’ of right (e.g. in international law)
implies moral considerations, as it amounts to stating that the law was used wrongly.
While the prohibition of abuse of law is a relatively uncontested feature, the grounds
for such prohibition are moot. We saw how concepts such as aequitas entered into
the Roman legal system: but how can moral values enter into international law? And
how is this warranted? Apparently, there is no ‘constitutional’ mechanism to ensure
that, in general, morality is trickling into international law.
An answer may derive from general principles, those the International Court of
Justice shall apply when deciding controversies (Article 38(1) (c) of the Statute of
the International Court of Justice). This would be nothing more than a domestic law
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analogy, indeed a Roman law analogy as an ‘indication of policy and principles’ (to
quote from Judge McNair in the Advisory Opinion on the International Status of
South West Africa): as Roman law had aequitas, so may international law have
some general principle. Naturally, the difference with aequitas is apparent: general
principles are not inherent in the system, they are derived from it. General principles
are anything but easily identifiable. General principles have not been agreed upon,
thus they are not the expression of democratic – and, one might say with Habermas,
ethical – dialogue.
Let us accept, for the sake of the argument, that the principles may nonetheless
be used for the purposes of instilling morality into a legal system. Then the general
principle of good faith is a serious candidate for the role. Nonetheless, general
principles do not come without difficulties. The first one is to determine what is the
content of this general principle. The second is the application of the very concept of
good faith – whatever its content – to the behaviour states or collective entities (such
as companies). The third is that not all abuses derive from lack of good faith.
Before addressing these challenges, we have to take a step back: who creates
those general principles and therefore what the ‘moral rules’ are in the international
community? If morality has to enter the system, whose morality is it? The ‘utopian’
answer is, of course, that the general principle – the morality – is universal.
It is far from clear what principle may perform the re-equilibrative function in
international law that is to say, what is the gate through which morality enters. Even
if, a gate is found, it is then far from obvious whose morality should permeate the
system.
Perhaps inspiration may be drawn, from aspects of the Roman law experience. For
Roman law, equity and good faith were never legally defined, precisely in order to
provide them, and the system, with flexibility. This openness allowed the law to adapt
to social and political changes throughout the centuries.
May bona fides – the principle Romans used to re-equilibrated and renew law – also
take that same function in international law? The difficult definition of the concept
of good faith should not be an obstacle – the undeniable difficult application, is not
an argument against the theoretical validity of the concept. The straightforward
application of desires and motivations – necessary to ascertain the good faith of an
actor – to collective entities is, we believe, more difficult.
Are we resuscitating a moral conception of law?  In other words, are we saying
that, in addition to a legal system there should be a (superior) system based on
rules derived from morality (or, as it used to be in the past, from Reason or from the
word of God)? Perhaps: invoking morality to ‘correct’ the law shatters a positivistic
paradigm. Or can Roman law that employs extrajudicial concepts and valuesto,
which guarantee flexibility to the legal system, show us a way out?
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